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We model learning in a continuous-time Brownian setting where there is prior ambiguity. The associated
model of preference values robustness and is time-consistent. It is applied to study optimal learning when
the choice between actions can be postponed, at a per-unit-time cost, in order to observe a signal that
provides information about an unknown parameter. The corresponding optimal stopping problem is solved
in closed-form, with a focus on two specic settings: Ellsberg's two-urn thought experiment expanded to
allow learning before the choice of bets, and a robust version of the classical problem of sequential testing
of two simple hypotheses about the unknown drift of a Wiener process. In both cases, the link between
robustness and the demand for learning is studied.
Key words : ambiguity, robust decisions, learning, partial information, optimal stopping, sequential testing
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History : This paper was rst submitted on March 2, 2018. An earlier version, titled "Optimal learning and
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1. Introduction
We consider a decision-maker (DM) choosing between three actions whose payos are uncertain
because they depend on both exogenous randomness and on an unknown parameter , = 0 or 1.
She can postpone the choice of action so as to learn about  by observing the realization of a signal
1
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modeled by a Brownian motion with drift. Because of a per-unit-time cost of sampling, which can
be material or cognitive, she faces an optimal stopping problem. A key feature is that DM does not
have sucient information to arrive at a single prior about , that is, there is ambiguity about .
Therefore, prior beliefs are represented by a nonsingleton set of probability measures, and DM seeks
to make robust choices of both stopping time and action by solving a maxmin problem. In addition,
she is forward-looking and dynamically consistent as in the continuous-time version of maxmin
utility given by Chen and Epstein (2002). One contribution herein is to extend the latter model
to accommodate learning. As a result, we capture robustness to ambiguity (or model uncertainty),
learning and time-consistency. The other contribution is to investigate optimal learning in the above
setting, with particular focus on two special cases that extend classical models. The corresponding
optimal stopping problems are solved explicitly and the eects of ambiguity on optimal learning
are determined.
The rst specic context begins with Ellsberg's metaphorical thought experiment: There are two
urns, each containing balls that are either red or blue, where the "known" or risky urn contains an
equal number of red and blue balls, while no information is provided about the proportion of red balls
in the "unknown" or ambiguous urn. DM must choose between betting on the color drawn from the
risky urn or from the ambiguous urn. The intuitive behavior highlighted by Ellsberg is the choice to
bet on the draw from the risky urn no matter the color, which behavior is paradoxical for subjective
expected utility theory, or indeed, for any model in which beliefs are represented by a single
probability measure. Ellsberg's paradox is often taken as a normative critique of the Bayesian model
and of the view that the single prior representation of beliefs is implied by rationality (e.g., Gilboa
2009, 2015; Gilboa et al. 2012). Here we add to the thought experiment by including a possibility
to learn. Specically, we allow DM to postpone her choice so that she can observe realizations of a
diusion process whose drift is equal to the proportion of red in the ambiguous urn. Under specic
parametric restrictions we completely describe the optimal joint learning and betting strategy. In
particular, we show that it can be optimal to reject learning completely, and, if some learning is
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optimal, then it is never optimal to bet on the risky urn after stopping. The rationality of no learning
suggests that one needs to reexamine and qualify the common presumption that ambiguity would
fade away, or at least diminish, in the presence of learning opportunities (Marinacci 2002). It can
also explain experimental ndings (Trautman and Zeckhauser 2013) that some subjects neglect
opportunities to learn about an ambiguous urn even at no visible (material) cost. In addition, our
model is suggestive of laboratory experiments that could provide further evidence on the connection
between ambiguity and the demand for learning.
The second application is to the classical problem of sequential testing of two simple hypothe-
ses about the unknown drift of a Wiener process. The seminal papers, both using a discrete-time
framework, are Wald (1945,1947), which shows that the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT)
provides an optimal trade-o between type I and type II errors, and Arrow, Blackwell and Girshick
(1949), which derives SPRT from utility maximization using dynamic programming arguments.
More recently, Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, Ch. 6) employ a Bayesian subjectivist approach and
derive SPRT as the solution to a continuous-time optimal stopping problem. We extend the lat-
ter analysis to accommodate situations where DM, a statistician/analyst, does not have sucient
information to justify reliance on a single prior. We show that it is optimal to stop if every "com-
patible" Bayesian (one whose prior is an element of the set of priors used by the robustness-seeking
DM) would choose to do so. But the corresponding statement for "continue" is false: it may be
optimal to stop under robustness even given a realized sample at which all compatible Bayesians
would choose to continue. In this sense, "sensitivity analysis" overstates the robustness value of
sampling.
We view our model as normative, which perspective is most evident in the hypothesis testing
context. Time-consistency of preference has obvious prescriptive appeal. It is important to under-
stand that, roughly speaking, time-consistency is the requirement that a contingent plan (e.g., a
stopping strategy) that is optimal ex ante remain optimal conditional on every subsequent real-
ization assuming there are no surprises or unforeseen events. A possible argument against such
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consistency, (that is sometimes expressed in the statistics literature), is that surprises are inevitable
and thus that any prescription should take that into account rather than excluding their possi-
bility. We would agree that a sophisticated decision-maker would expect that surprises may occur
while (necessarily) being unable to describe what form they could take. However, to the best of our
knowledge there currently does not exist a convincing model in the economics, statistics or psy-
chology literatures of how such an individual should (or would) behave, that is, how the awareness
that she may be missing something in her perception of the future should (or would) aect current
behavior. That leaves time-consistency as a sensible guiding principle with the understanding that
reoptimization can (and should) occur if there is a surprise.
A brief review of other relevant literature concludes this introduction. The classical Bayesian
model of sequential decision-making, including in particular applications to inference and exper-
imentation, are discussed in Howard (1970) and the references therein. The maxmin model of
ambiguity averse preference is axiomatized in a static setting in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
(which owes an intellectual debt to the Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) model of decision-making under
ignorance), and in a multi-period discrete-time framework in Epstein and Schneider (2003) where
time-consistency is one of the key axioms. Optimal stopping problems have been studied in the
absence of time-consistency. It is well-known that modeling a concern with ambiguity and robust
decision-making leads to "nonlinear" objective functions, which, in a dynamic setting and in the
absence of commitment, can lead to time-inconsistency issues (Peskir 2017). A similar issue arises
also in a risk context where there is a known objective probability law, but where preference does
not conform to von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility theory (Ebert and Strack 2018; Huang
et al. 2018). Such models are problematic in normative contexts. It is not clear why one would
ever prescribe to a decision-maker (who is unable or unwilling to commit) that she should adopt a
criterion function that would imply time-inconsistent plans and that she should then resolve these
inconsistencies by behaving strategically against her future selves (as is commonly assumed). The
recursive maxmin model has been used in macroeconomics and nance (e.g., Epstein and Schneider
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2010) and also in robust multistage stochastic optimization (e.g., Shapiro (2016) and the references
therein, including to the closely related literature on conditional risk measures). Shapiro focuses on
a property of sets of measures, called rectangularity following Epstein and Schneider (2003), that
underlies recursivity of utility and time-consistency. Most of the existing literature deals with a
discrete-time setting. The theoretical literature on learning under ambiguity is sparse and limited
to passive learning (e.g., Epstein and Schneider 2007, 2008). With regard to hypothesis testing,
this paper adds to the literature on robust Bayesian statistics (Berger 1984,1985,1994; Rios-Insua
and Ruggeri 2000), which is largely restricted to a static environment. Walley (1991) goes further
and considers both a prior and a single posterior stage, but not sequential hypothesis testing. For
a frequentist approach to robust sequential testing see Huber (1965).
Closest to the present paper is the literature on bandit problems with ambiguity and robustness
(Caro and Das Gupta 2015; Li 2019). Both papers model endogenous learning (or experimentation)
by maxmin dynamically consistent agents. Their models dier from ours in that they assume
discrete time, an exogenously given horizon, and also in the nature of experimentation. In our
model, the once-and-for-all choice of action and resulting payo come after all learning has ceased,
while in bandit problems, action choice and ow payos are continuous and intertwined with
learning (for example, the cost of experimentation is the implied reduction in current ow payos).
Consequently, their analyses and characterizations are much dierent, for example, their focus on
the existence of a suitable Gittins index has no counterpart in our model.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model of utility extending Chen-
Epstein to accommodate learning. Readers who are primarily interested in applications can skip
this relatively technical section and move directly to x3 where the "applied" optimal stopping
problems are studied. The (more) general optimal stopping problem is solved in x4 (Theorem
4), thereby providing a unifying perspective on the two applications and some indication of the
robustness of the results therein. Proofs are contained in the e-companion to this paper.
Epstein and Ji: Optimal Learning under Robustness and Time-Consistency
6 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2018-03-062
2. Recursive utility with learning
For background regarding time-consistency in the maxmin framework, consider rst the following
informal outline that anticipates the specic setting of this paper. DM faces uncertainty about a
payo-relevant state space 
 due to uncertainty about the value of a parameter  2 . Each 
determines a unique probability law on 
, but there is prior ambiguity about the parameter that
is represented by a nonsingleton set M0 of priors on . As time proceeds, DM learns about the
parameter through observation of a signal whose increments are distributed i.i.d. conditional on
. At issue is how to model beliefs about 
, that is, the set P0 of predictive priors. (Throughout
we adopt the common practice of distinguishing terminologically between beliefs about the state
space, referred to as predictive priors, and beliefs about parameters, which are referred to as priors.)
A seemingly natural approach is to take P0 to be the set of all measures that can be obtained by
combining some prior 0 in M0 with the given conditionally i.i.d. likelihood. Learning is modeled
through the set of posteriors Mt at t obtained via prior-by-prior Bayesian updating of M0, and a
corresponding set Pt of predictive posteriors is obtained as above. Finally, at each t 0, Pt guides
choice according to the maxmin model. The point, however, is that time-consistency is violated: in
general, ex ante optimal plans do not remain optimal according to updated beliefs. The reason is
straightforward. Behavior at t is depends on the worst-case posterior t inMt, but worst-cases at
dierent nodes need not belong to same prior 0. This is in contrast with the ex ante perspective
expressed via P0 where a single worst-case prior 0 determines the entire ex ante optimal plan. To
restore dynamic consistency, one can enlarge P0 by adding to it all measures obtained by pasting
together alien posteriors, leading to a "rectangular" set that is closed with respect to further
pasting. One can think of the enlarged set as capturing both the subjectively possible probability
laws and backward induction reasoning by DM.
See Epstein and Schneider (2003) for further discussion and axiomatic foundations in a discrete-
time framework, and Chen and Epstein (2002){CE below{for a continuous-time formulation that we
outline next. Then we describe how it can be adapted to include learning with partial information.
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The latter description is given in the simplest context adequate for the applications below. However,
it should be clear that it can be adapted more generally.
Let (
;G1; P0) be a probability space, and W = (Wt)0t<1 a 1-dimensional Brownian motion
which generates the ltration G = fGtgt0, with Gt % G1. (All probability spaces are taken to
be complete and all related ltrations are augmented in the usual sense.) The measure P0 is a
reference measure whose role is only to dene null events. CE dene a set of predictive priors P0
on (
;G1) through specication of their densities with respect to P0. To do so, they take as an
additional primitive a (suitably adapted) set-valued process (t). (Technical restrictions are that
t : 
 K Rd for some compact set K independent of t, 0 2 t (!) dt
 dP0 a:s:, and that each
t is convex- and compact-valued.) Dene the associated set of real-valued processes by
= f= (t) j t(!)2t(!) dt
 dP0 a:s:g:
Then each  2  denes a probability measure on G1, denoted P , that is equivalent to P0 on
each Gt, and is given by
dP 
dP0
jGt= expf 
Z t
0
2sds 
Z t
0
sdWsg for all t.
Accordingly, each t(!) 2 t(!) can be thought of roughly as dening conditional beliefs about
Gt+dt, and t (!) is called the set of density generators at (t;!). By the Girsanov Theorem,
dW t = tdt+ dWt (1)
is a Brownian motion under P , which thus can be understood as an alternative hypothesis about
the drift of the driving process W (the drift is 0 under P0). Finally,
P0  fP  :  2g . (2)
(The "pasting" referred to above is accomplished through the fact that  is constructed by taking
all selections from the ts.)
The set P0 is used to dene a time 0 utility function on a suitable set of random payos denom-
inated in utils. In order to model in the sequel the choice of how long to learn (or sample), we
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consider a set of stopping times  , that is, each  is an adapted R+-valued and fGtg-adapted ran-
dom variable dened on 
, that is, f! :  (!)> tg 2 Gt for every t. For each such  , utility is dened
on the set L() of real-valued random variables given by
L() = f j  is G -measurable and sup
Q2P0
EQ j  j<1g.
The time 0 utility of any  2L() is given by
U0 () = inf
Q2P0
EQ =  sup
Q2P0
EQ[ ]: (3)
It is natural to consider also conditional utilities at each (t;!), where
Ut () = ess inf
Q2P0
EQ[ j Gt]. (4)
In words, Ut () is the utility of  at time t conditional on the information available then and given
the state ! (the dependence of Ut () on ! is suppressed notationally). The special construction of
P0 delivers the following counterpart of the law of total probability (or law of iterated expectations):
For each , and 0 t < t0,
Ut () = ess inf
Q2P0
EQ [Ut0 () j Gt] . (5)
This recursivity ultimately delivers the time-consistency of optimal choices.
The components P0, W , (t) and fGtg are primitives in CE. Next we specify them in terms of
the deeper primitives of a model that includes learning about an unknown parameter  2R.
Specically, begin with a measurable space (
;F), a ltration fFtg, Ft%F1 F , and a collec-
tion fP  : 2M0g of pairwise equivalent probability measures on (
;F). Though  is an unknown
deterministic parameter, for mathematical precision we view  as a random variable on (
;F).
Further, for each 2M0, P  induces the distribution  for  via (A) = P (f 2Ag) for all Borel
measurable A. Accordingly, M0 can be viewed as a set of priors on , and its nonsingleton
nature indicates ambiguity about . There is also a standard Brownian motion B = (Bt), with
generated ltration fFBt g, such that B is independent of  under each P . B is the Brownian
motion driving the signals process Z = (Zt) according to
Zt =
Z t
0
ds+
Z t
0
dBs = t+Bt; (6)
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where  is a known positive constant. Because only realizations of Zt are observable, take fGtg to
be the ltration generated by Z. Assuming knowledge of the signal structure, Bayesian updating
of  2M0 gives the posterior t at time t. Thus prior-by-prior Bayesian updating leads to the
set-valued process (Mt) of posteriors on .
Proceed to specify the other CE components P0, W and (t).
Step 1. Take  2M0. By standard ltering theory (Liptser and Shiryaev 1977, Theorem 8.3), if
we replace the unknown parameter  by the estimate bt = R dt, then we can rewrite (6) in the
form
dZt = ^

t (Zt)dt+(dBt+
  ^t (Zt)

dt) (7)
= ^t (Zt)dt+d ~B

t ,
where the innovation process ( ~Bt ) is a standard fGtg-adapted Brownian motion on (
;G1; P ).
Thus ( ~Bt ) takes the same role as (W

t ) in CE (see (1) above). Rewrite (7) as
d ~Bt = 
1

^t (Zt)dt+
1

dZt
which suggests that (Zt=) (resp. ( ^t (Zt)=)) can be chosen as the Brownian motion (Wt) (resp.
the drift (t)) in (1).
Step 2. Find a reference probability measure P0 on (
;G1) under which (Zt=) is a fGtg-adapted
Brownian motion on (
;G1). Fix 2M0 and dene P0 by:
dP0
dP
jGt = expf  122
R t
0
(^s (Zs))
2ds  1

R t
0
^s (Zs)d ~B

s g
= expf 1
22
R t
0
(^s (Zs))
2ds  1
2
R t
0
^s (Zs)dZsg.
By Girsanov's Theorem, (Zt=) is a fGtg-adapted Brownian motion under P0.
Step 3. Viewing P0 as a reference measure, perturb it. For each 2M0, dene P 0 on (
;G1) by
dP 0
dP0
jGt= expf 
1
22
Z t
0
(^s (Zs))
2ds+
1
2
Z t
0
^s (Zs)dZsg:
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By Girsanov, d ~Bt =  1 ^t (Zt)dt+ 1dZt is a Brownian motion under P 0 .
In general, P  6= P 0 . However, they induce the identical distribution for Z. This is because ( ~Bt )
is a fGtg-adapted Brownian motion under both P  and P 0 . Therefore, by the uniqueness of weak
solutions to SDEs, the solution Zt of (7) on (
;F1; P ) and the solution Z 0t of (7) on (
;G1; P 0 )
have identical distributions. (Argue as in Oksendal (2005, Example 8.6.9)). Given that only the
distribution of signals matters in our model, there is no reason to distinguish between the two
probability measures. Thus we apply CE to the following components: W and P0 dened in Step
2, and t given by
t = f ^t = : 2M0; bt = Z dtg. (8)
In summary, taking these specications for P0, W , (t) and fGtg in the CE model yields a set
P0 of predictive priors, and a corresponding utility function, that capture prior ambiguity about
the parameter  (through M0), learning as signals are realized (through updating to the set of
posteriors Mt), and robust (maxmin) and time-consistent decision-making (because of (5)). We
use this model in the optimal stopping problems that follow. The only remaining primitive isM0,
which is specied to suit the particular setting of interest.
As indicated, the key technical step in our extension of CE is in adopting the weak formulation
rather than their strong formulation. For readers who may be unfamiliar with this distinction we
suggest Oksendal (2005, Section 5.3) for discussion of weak versus strong solutions of SDEs, and
Zhang (2017, Chapter 9). The latter exposits both the technical advantages of the weak formulation
and its economic rationale, notably in models with imperfect information (such as here, where
given (6), Z is observed but not B), or asymmetric information (such as in principal-agent models).
In our context, the weak formulation is suggested if one views B not as modeling a physical noise
or shock, but rather as a way to specify that the distribution of (Zt  t)= is standard normal
(conditional on ).
Remark 1. We add a few remarks about related literature. Cheng and Riedel (2013) describe
how CE can be applied to study optimal stopping, but they do not discuss learning. CE suggest
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(but do not prove) that their framework can accommodate passive learning. We are aware of two
papers that explicitly address passive learning in the CE framework{Choi (2016) and Miao (2009){
whose models are much dierent than the above. Two core distinguishing features of Choi's model
are: (i) his set of priors M0 consists exclusively of Dirac, or dogmatic, measures which naturally
do not admit Bayesian updating; and (ii) ambiguity aects learning primarily because there are
multiple-likelihoods, reecting the assumption that the signal structure is not well understood. See
the related discrete-time work of Epstein and Schneider (2007, 2008) for the distinction between
prior ambiguity about an unknown parameter, as in our model, and ambiguity about the signal
structure (or the likelihood function, as in Choi). Our focus on prior ambiguity derives from our
objective{trying to understand the connection between ambiguity and (optimal) learning in the
situation most favorable for learning which is that the signal structure is well understood.
Miao focuses on partial information and ltering in the presence of ambiguity. In his approach,
application of CE is immediate and partial information does not make much dierence for the
analysis. He applies classical ltering for a reference model and then adds time- and history-
invariant ambiguity to the updated reference measure. There is no interaction between ltering
and ambiguity; for example, the dependence of estimates on the prior  as in (8) is absent.
3. Optimal learning
3.1. The framework and general problem
DM must choose an action from the set A= fa0; a1; a2g. Payos are uncertain and depend on an
unknown parameter . Before choosing an action, DM can learn about  by observing realizations
of the signal process Z given by (6), where  is a known positive constant. There is a constant
per-unit-time cost c > 0 of learning. (The underlying state space 
, the ltration fGtg generated
by Z, and other notation are as in x2. Unless specied otherwise, all processes below are taken to
be fGtg-adapted even where not stated explicitly.)
If DM stops learning at t, then her conditional expected payo (in utils) is Xt; think of Xt as the
indirect utility she can attain by choosing optimally from A. DM is forward-looking and has time
Epstein and Ji: Optimal Learning under Robustness and Time-Consistency
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0 beliefs about future signals given by the set P0 (
;G1) described in the previous section.
Her choice of when to stop is described by a stopping time (or strategy)  , which is restricted to
be uniformly integrable (supQ2P0 EQ <1); the set of all stopping strategies is  . As a maxmin
agent she chooses an optimal stopping strategy   by solving
max
2 
min
P2P0
EP (X   c) . (9)
It remains to specify M0, which determines P0 as described in x2, and Xt.
We assume that all priors  in M0 have binary support = f0,1g, 0 < 1. Specically, let
M0 = fm = (1 m)0 +m1 :m0 mm0g. (10)
Therefore, M0 can be identied with the probability interval [m0;m0] for the larger parameter
value 1. Let 0<m0 <m0 < 1.
Bayesian updating of each prior yields the following set of posteriors at t,
Mt = f(1 m)0 +m1 :mt mmtg, (11)
where, by Liptser and Shiryaev (1977, Theorem 9.1),
mt =
m0
1 m0'(t;Zt)
1+
m0
1 m0'(t;Zt)
, mt =
m0
1 m0'(t;Zt)
1+ m0
1 m0'(t;Zt)
, (12)
and
'(t; z) = expf1  0
2
z  1
22
(21   20)tg: (13)
Conditional on the parameter value, payos are given by u (ai; j), where each u (ai; j) is non-
negative. Think of u (; j) as including the valuation of any risk remaining even if j is known to be
true, for example, u (ai; j) could be the expected utility of the lottery implied by (ai; j). Payos
are assumed to satisfy: for each i; j = 0;1, i 6= j,
u (aj; j) = u (ai; i)>u (aj; i) . (14)
Thus a0 is better than a1 given 0, and the reverse given 1, and the payo to the better action is
the same for both parameter values. The payo to the third action a2 does not depend on , and
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can be thought of as a default or outside option. Its payo is not ambiguous because incomplete
condence about  is the only source of ambiguity in the model, but choice of a2 may entail risk.
Adopt the notation
u2 = u (a2; 0) = u (a2; 1) . (15)
It is evident that action a2 may be irrelevant if its payo is suciently low, for example, if u2 = 0.
To exclude the trivial case where a2 is always chosen, assume that
u2 <u (ai; i) , i= 0;1.
Consider next payos conditional on time t beliefs about  as represented by the set of posteriors
Mt. The Gilboa-Schmeidler utility of ai is min2Mt
R
u (ai; )d. Therefore, if DM chooses an
optimal action at time t, then her payo is
Xt =max

min
2Mt
Z
u (a0; )d; min
2Mt
Z
u (a1; )d;u2

. (16)
The preceding completes specication of the optimal stopping problem (9). Its solution is
described in x4 under two alternative additional assumptions:
Payo symmetry u (a0; 1) = u (a1; 0)
No risky option u2  u (ai; j), i 6= j = 0;1
The rst assumption adds to the symmetry contained in (14). Given (14), the second implies that
action a2 is (weakly) inferior to each of a0 and a1 conditional on either parameter value. Hence, it
would never be chosen uniquely and can be ignored, leaving only two actions. These assumptions
are satised respectively by the two special models upon which we focus: Ellsberg's urns (payo
symmetry) and hypothesis testing (no risky option). We focus on these rst because they extend
classic models in the literature and because they provide simply distinct insights into the connection
between ambiguity and optimal learning.
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3.2. Learning and Ellsberg's urns
There are two urns each containing balls that are either red or blue: a risky urn in which the
proportion of red balls is 1
2
and an ambiguous urn in which the color composition is unknown.
Denote by + 1
2
the unknown proportion of red balls. Thus  denotes the bias towards red:  > 0
indicates more red than blue,  < 0 indicates the opposite, and  = 0 indicates an equal number
as in the risky urn. DM can choose between betting on the draw from the risky or ambiguous urn
and also on drawing red or blue. In the absence of learning, the intuitive behavior highlighted by
Ellsberg is to bet on the draw from the risky urn no matter the color. Here we consider betting
preference when an ambiguity averse decision-maker can defer the choice between bets until after
learning optimally about .
Before proceeding, we address the possible concern that our model of learning, namely the signal
structure (6), is unnatural in the Ellsberg context where sampling with replacement from the
ambiguous urn suggests itself. However, just as the Ellsberg choice problems are understood to
be metaphorical and suggestive examples, we intend our model with learning to be viewed in the
same spirit. For example, one can reinterpret our version of the Ellsberg setting as follows. An
investor must choose between investing in a known (risky) stock or in an unknown/unfamiliar
(ambiguous) stock. If she chooses the latter, she can go long (corresponding to betting on red)
or short (corresponding to betting on blue). Before choosing, she can observe the price Zt of the
ambiguous stock, which evolves according to (6) and provides information about an underlying
fundamental .
To resume with the formal analysis, we apply the model described above with particular spec-
ications for its key primitives A, , M0 and u. For A, let a2 denote a bet on the risky urn and
let a1 (a0) denote the bet on drawing red (blue) from the ambiguous urn. (There is no need to
dierentiate between bets on red and blue for the risky urn.) Take = f0; 1g, where 0+ 1 = 0,
or equivalently, for some 0<< 1
2
,
0 = , 1 = . (17)
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Thus only two possible biases, of equal size, are thought possible, (the proportion of red is either
1
2
   or 1
2
+ ). However, there is ambiguity about which direction for the bias is more likely.
This ambiguity is modeled by M0 having the form in (10), where we assume in addition that the
probability interval for  (the bias towards red) is such that m0+m0 = 1, or equivalently, for some
0< < 1,
m0 =
1  
2
, m0 =
1+ 
2
. (18)
Thus the lowest probability for a bias towards blue equals that for red, implying indierence at
time 0 between bets on red and blue. This assumption, and also the color symmetry in (17), are
natural since information about the ambiguous urn gives no reason to distinguish between colors.
We are left with the two parameters  and . We interpret  as modeling ambiguity (aversion):
the probability interval

1 
2
; 1+
2

for the bias towards red is larger if  increases. At the extreme
when  = 0, then M0 is the singleton according to which the two biases are equally likely, and
DM is a Bayesian who faces uncertainty with variance 2 about the true bias, but no ambiguity.
We interpret  as measuring the degree of this prior uncertainty, or prior variance; (= 0 implies
certainty that the composition of the ambiguous urn is identical to that of the risky urn).
Finally, specify payos u. All bets have the same winning and losing prizes, denominated in
utils, which can be normalized to 1 and 0 respectively. Given the composition of the ambiguous
urn, then only risk is involved in every bet, and an expected utility calculation yields
u (a0; ) = u (a1; ) = + 12 , u (a0; ) = u (a1; ) =   12 , and u2 = 12 . (19)
The assumptions in x3.1 are readily veried.
For convenience of the reader, we include the implied expression for the conditional payo Xt =
X(Zt):
X(Zt) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
( 1
2
+)  2
1+ 1 1+'(Zt)
if Zt >
2
2
log( 1+
1 )
( 1
2
 )+ 2
1+ 1+1 '(Zt)
if Zt < 22 log( 1+1 )
1
2
otherwise,
(20)
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where '(z) = exp(2z=2). Thus if Zt is large positive (negative), then a bet on drawing red (blue)
from the ambiguous urn is optimal. For intermediate values, there is not enough evidence for a bias
in either direction to compensate for the ambiguity and betting on the risky urn is optimal. This
is true in particular ex ante where Z0 = 0, consistent with the intuitive ambiguity-averse behavior
in Ellsberg's 2-urn experiment without learning.
We give an explicit solution to the optimal stopping problem (9) satisfying (17)-(19). To do so,
let
l(r) = 2 log(
r
1  r ) 
1
r
+
1
1  r ; r 2 (0;1), (21)
and dene br by
l(br) = 23
c2
. (22)
br is uniquely dened thereby and 1
2
< br < 1, because l() is strictly increasing, l(0) = 1, l( 1
2
) = 0,
and l(1) =1.
Theorem 1. (i)   = 0 if and only if 1+
2
 br, in which case X =X0 = 12 .
(ii) Let 1+
2
< br. Then the optimal stopping time satises   > 0 and is given by
  =minft 0 : jZt j zg;
where
z =
2
2

log
1+ 
1   + log
r
1  r

> 0, (23)
and r, br < r < 1, is the unique solution to the equation
l(r)+ l(
1+ 
2
) =
43
c2
. (24)
Moreover, on stopping either the bet on red is chosen (if Z  z) or the bet on blue is chosen (if
Z  z); the bet on the risky urn is never optimal at   > 0. Finally, if  < 0 < 2br  1, and if  0
is the corresponding optimal stopping time, then  0   .
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The two cases are dened by the relative magnitudes of , parametrizing ambiguity, and br,
which is an increasing function of 3= (c2); in particular, through , it depends positively on the
payo to knowing the direction of the true bias. Thus (i) considers the case where ambiguity is
large relative to payos (and taking also sampling cost and signal variance into account). Then no
learning is optimal and the bet on the risky urn is chosen immediately. In contrast, some learning
is necessarily optimal given small ambiguity (case (ii)), including in the limiting Bayesian model
with  = 0. Thus it is optimal to reject learning if and only if ambiguity, as measured by , is
suitably large. In case (ii), it is optimal to sample as long as the signal Zt lies in the continuation
interval ( z; z). Two features of this learning region stand out. First, when Zt hits either endpoint,
learning stops and DM bets on the ambiguous urn. Thus the risky urn is chosen (if and) only if
it is not optimal to learn. The second noteworthy feature is that sampling increases with greater
ambiguity as measured by , though when  reaches 2br  1, then, by (i), it is optimal to reject any
learning.
There is simple intuition for the preceding. First, consider the eect of ambiguity (large ) on
the incentive to learn. DM's prior beliefs admit only  and   as the two possible values for
the true bias. She will incur the cost of learning if she believes that she is likely to learn quickly
which of these is true. She understands that she will come to accept  (or  ) as being true given
realization of suciently large positive (negative) values for Zt. A diculty is that she is not sure
which probability law in her set P0 describes the signal process. As a conservative decision-maker,
she bases her decisions on the worst-case scenario P  in her set. Because she is trying to learn,
the worst-case minimizes the probability of extreme, hence revealing, signal realizations, which,
informally speaking, occurs if P (fdZt > 0g j Zt > 0) and P (fdZt < 0g j Zt < 0) are as small as
possible. That is, if Zt > 0, then the distribution of the increment dZt is computed using the
posterior associated with that prior inM0 which assigns the largest probability 1+2 to the negative
bias  , while if Zt < 0, then the distribution of the increment is computed using the posterior
associated with the prior assigning the largest probability 1+
2
to the positive bias . It follows that,
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from the perspective of the worst-case scenario, the signal structure is less informative the greater
is . Accordingly, conditional on some learning being optimal, then it must be with the expectation
of a long sampling period that increases in length with . A second eect of an increase in  is that
it reduces the ex ante utility of betting on the ambiguous urn and hence implies that signals in an
increasingly large interval would not change betting preference. Consequently, a small sample is
unlikely to be of value { only long samples are useful. Together, these two eects suggest existence
of a cuto value for  beyond which no amount of learning is suciently attractive to justify its
cost. At the cuto, here 2br  1, DM is just indierent between stopping and learning for another
instant.
There remains the following question for smaller values of : why is it never optimal to try
learning for a while and then, for some sample realizations, to stop and bet on the risky urn?
The intuition, adapted from Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki (2018), is that this feature is a
consequence of the specication M0 for the set of priors. To see why, suppose that Zt is small for
some positive t. A possible interpretation, particularly for large t, is that the true bias is small and
thus that there is little to be gained by continuing to sample { DM might as well stop and bet on
the risky urn. But this reasoning is excluded when, as in our specication, DM is certain that the
bias is . Then signals suciently near 0 must be noise and the situation is essentially the same
as it was at the start. Hence, if stopping to bet on the risky urn were optimal at t, it would have
been optimal also at time 0. This intuition is suggestive of the likely consequences of generalizing
the specication ofM0. Suppose, for example, thatM0 is such that all its priors share a common
nite support. We conjecture that then the predicted incompatibility of learning and betting on
the risky urn would be overturned if the zero bias point is in the common support.
Finally, using the closed-form solution in the theorem, we can give more concrete expression to
the eect of ambiguity on optimal learning. Restrict attention to values of  in [0;2br  1), where
some learning is optimal, and denote by P  the probability distribution of (Zt) if  is the true bias.
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Then, by well-known results regarding hitting times of Brownian motion with drift (Borodin and
Salminen 2015), the mean sample length according to P  is
E  =
8>><>>:
(z=)
2

tanh(z=2)
z=2

if  6= 0
(z=)
2
if = 0,
(25)
which is increasing in . Note also that Z > 0 if and only if the bet on red (blue) is chosen on
stopping if  > 0 ( < 0). Thus the probability, if  6= 0 is the true bias, of choosing the "correct"
bet on stopping is given by
P  (fZ > 0g) = 1
1+ exp

  2jj
2
z
 , if  6= 0,
which increases with . (To prove this equality, apply the optional stopping theorem to the P -
martingale e 2Zt=
2
.)
The proof of Theorem 1 yields a closed-form expression for the value function associated with the
optimal stopping problem. In particular, the value at time 0 satises (from (EC.4) and (EC.10)),
v0  12 =
8><>:
0 if 1+
2
 br
c2
42
[ 1
r(1 r)   4(1+)(1 ) ] if 1+2 < br. (26)
Since the payo 1
2
is the best available without learning, v0  12 is the value of the learning option.
It is positive for small  < 2br  1 and declines continuously to 0 as  increases to the switch point.
(Note that 1+
2
= br implies both are equal in turn to r, and hence that v0 is continuous at = 2br 1.)
This is consistent with intuition given above.
As a numerical example, let (c;;) =
 
:01;1; 1
8

, which gives :0488 as the cuto for . Thus
learning is rejected if = :05. For = :04, however,   > 0 and E  = :61 under P =0. Neither of
the values for  is extreme: in the classic Ellsberg setting (with no learning), they imply probability
equivalents for the bet on red equal to :4875 and :4900 for = :05 and = :04 respectively.
3.3. A robust sequential hypothesis test
DM samples the signal process Z with the objective of then choosing between the two statistical
hypotheses
H0 : = 0 and H1 : = ,
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where  > 0. The novelty relative to Arrow, Blackwell and Girschik (1949) and Peskir and Shiryaev
(2006) is that there is prior ambiguity about the value of  and a robust decision procedure is
sought.
The following specialization of the general model is adopted. Let = f0; g. The actions a0 and
a1 are accept H0 and accept H1, respectively. A third action is absent because there is no "outside
option" - one of the hypotheses must be chosen. (Formally, one could include a2 and specify its
payo below to be zero, in which case it would never be chosen.) The set of priors M0 is as given
in (10), corresponding to the probability interval [m0;m0] for = . Finally, payos are given by
u (a0;0) = u (a1; ) = a+ b,
u (a0; ) = b, u (a1;0) = a,
where a; b > 0. (Payos in this context are usually specied in terms of a loss function that is to be
minimized. The loss function L satisfying L (a0;0) = L (a1; ) = 0, L (a0; ) = a, and L (a1;0) = b,
gives an equivalent reformulation.)
There are two dierences in specication from the Ellsberg context. First, there is no counterpart
of the risky urn when choosing between hypotheses. Second, while symmetry between colors is
natural in the Ellsberg context, symmetry between hypotheses is not; thus, b need not equal a and
the probability interval [m0;m0] need not be symmetric about
1
2
.
The optimal stopping problem (9) admits a closed-form solution. For perspective, consider rst
the special Bayesian case (M0 = fg, hence Mt = ftg, t () = mt). Denote by ~r`B < ~rRB the
solutions to (33), which in this context simplies to
l(~rRB)  l(~rlB) = a+bc^
1
~rR
B(1 ~rRB)
  1
~rl
B(1 ~rlB)
= b a
c^
:
(27)
Then we have the following classical result.
Theorem 2 (Peskir and Shiryaev 2006). In the Bayesian case, for any prior probability m0
it is optimal to continue at t if and only if
~r`B <mt < erRB: (28)
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Otherwise, it is optimal to accept H1 or H0 according as mt  erRB or mt  er`B respectively.
In the model with ambiguity, the cut-o values are ~r` and ~rR, ~r` < ~rR, that solve the appropriate
version of (33), and we have the following generalization of the classical result.
Theorem 3. In the model with ambiguity, it is optimal to stop and accept H1 or H0 according as
mt  erR or mt  er` respectively. Otherwise, it is optimal to continue.
In addition, if a= b, then
er`B < er` and erR < erRB. (29)
Under the assumption of payo symmetry (a= b), the theorem has noteworthy implications for
the relation between the optimal stopping strategies for the Bayesian and the robustness-seeking
DM. (We conjecture that (29) is valid even if a 6= b, but a proof has escaped us.) If m0 2 [m0;m0],
refer to a compatible Bayesian. The theorem implies:
1. If every compatible Bayesian stops and chooses ai, then it is optimal also for DM to stop and
choose ai, i= 1;2.
2. If every compatible Bayesian continues, then it may still be optimal for DM to stop.
In other words, DM should accept a unanimous recommendation of compatible Bayesian experts
if it is to stop and choose a specic action, but not necessarily if it is to continue. In this sense,
"sensitivity analysis" overstates the robustness value of sampling.
The intuition is clear. Prior ambiguity leads to the signal structure being perceived as less likely
to be informative (seen from the perspective of the worst-case measure P  - see the outline at
the start of the proof of Theorem 4), even though the signal structure itself is not ambiguous. In
contrast, there is no counterpart given multiple Bayesian agents - each is condent in beliefs about
 and is certain that signal increments are conditionally i.i.d. Only DM internalizes uncertainty
about the probability law and discounts the benets of learning accordingly.
Remark 2. As is made clear in Theorem 4, stopping conditions can be stated equivalently in
terms of either the signal process (as in the Ellsberg model), or posteriors (as here). In the text,
we have adopted the formulations that seem more natural for each particular setting. For example,
the use of posteriors above facilitates comparison with the classical Bayesian result.
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Remark 3. Time-consistency in the present context is closely related to the Stopping Rule Prin-
ciple { that the stopping rule should have no eect on what is inferred from observed data and
hence on the decision taken after stopping (Berger 1985). It is well-known that: (i) conventional
frequentist methods, based on ex ante xed sample size signicance levels, violate this Principle
and permit the analyst to sample to a foregone conclusion when data-dependent stopping rules are
permitted; and (ii) Bayesian posterior odds analysis satises the Principle. Kadane, Schervish and
Seidenfeld (1996) point to the law of iterated expectations as responsible for excluding foregone
conclusions (if the prior is countably additive). Equation (5) is a nonlinear counterpart that we
suspect plays a similar role in our model (though details are beyond the scope of this paper).
4. A more general theorem
In order to condense notation, we write uij in place of u (ai; j), i; j = 0;1.
Theorem 4 below describes the solution to the optimal stopping problem in x3.1 assuming either
payo symmetry (u01 = u10) or no risky option (u2 minfu10; u01g). Payo symmetry is satised
in Theorem 1, but the latter assumes more, specically ex ante indierence between a0 and a1
(m0+m0 = 1) and u2 =
1
2
(u00+u10). Thus it is extended below by Theorem 4(a). The assumption
of no risky option is the crucial element in the hypothesis testing example, and the corresponding
optimal stopping problem is isomorphic to that in part (b) of Theorem 4.
Both mt and mt dened in (12) are increasing functions of '(t; zt). It follows that there exists a
unique pair of probabilities  and  and a unique (deterministic) signal realization trajectory (ezt)
satisfying, for every t,
=mt(ezt), =mt(ezt), and
u11+(1 )u10 = u01+(1 )u00.
For example, ez0 = 0,  =m0 and  =m0 if and only if a0 and a1 are indierent ex ante. More
generally, a0 and a1 are indierent conditional on the signal ezt at t and a0 (a1) is preferred at t if
Zt < (>) ezt.
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Normalize the cost of learning to bc, c^= 2c2=(1  0)2.
Optimal stopping strategies will be described in terms of several critical values, that are, in turn,
dened using the functions l and el: For all r in (0;1),
l(r) = 2 log(
r
1  r ) 
1
r
+
1
1  r
~l(r) = log(
r
1  r )+
r
1  r .
Let (rR1 ; r
R
2 ), (r
l
1; r
l
2), (r
R; rl) and (~rR; ~rl) solve the following equations respectively:
l(rR2 )  l(rR1 ) = u11 u10c^
~l(rR2 )  ~l(rR1 ) = u2 u10c^ ,
(30)
l(rl2)  l(rl1) = u00 u01c^
~l(rl2)  ~l(rl1) = u2 u00c^ ,
(31)
l(rR)  l() = u11 u10
c^
l(rl)  l() = u00 u01
c^
,
(32)
l(~rR)  l() = l(~rl)  l()+ u11 u10+u00 u01
c^
~l(erR)  ~l()  (l(erR)  l()) =
el(erl) el()  (l(erl)  l()) :
(33)
(The latter reduces to (32) if payo symmetry is satised.)
Dene
u2 =
c^
2
[
1
rl(1  rl)  
1
(1 ) ]+
u00 u01
2
: (34)
Besides the existence and uniqueness assertions, the next lemma proves a number of properties
that are important for the optimal stopping theorem to follow.
Lemma 1. There exist unique solutions to (32) and (33), and the solutions to the latter satisfy
~rl <, ~rR >. (35)
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If u2  u2 , then there exist unique solutions also to (30) and (31), and the solutions satisfy
rl2 < r
l
1, r
R
1 < r
R
2 ,  < r
R, rl <.
If payo symmetry is also satised, then:
+= 1= rl+ rR, and (36)
rl1   () rR1   () u2  u2 . (37)
Dene
f(t; r) =
1+ 0
2
t+
2
1  0 log(
1 m0
m0
r
1  r )
f(t; r) =
1+ 0
2
t+
2
1  0 log(
1 m0
m0
r
1  r ).
Then mt
 
f(t; r)

= r=mt
 
f(t; r)

, and, for any r1 and r2,
f(t; r1)  ezt() r1   (38)
f(t; r2)  ezt() r2  .
Finally, dene three stopping times:
0  minft 0 :Zt  f(t; rl2)g
= minft 0 : mt  rl2g,
1  minft 0 :Zt  f(t; rR2 )g
= minft 0 :mt  rR2 g, and
2  minft 0 : f(t; rl1)Zt  f(t; rR1 )g
= minft 0 :mt  rl1 and mt  rR1 g.
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Theorem 4. (a) Assume payo symmetry (u01 = u10).
(a.i) If rl1  , then the optimal stopping time   is given by
  =minfi : i= 0;1;2g.
Moreover, if   = i, then ai is optimal on stopping. In particular, if there is ex ante indierence
between a0 and a1 (=m0 and =m0), then 
 = 0 and a2 is chosen.
(a.ii) If rl1 >, then
  = minft 0 : Zt  f(t; rl) or Zt  f(t; rR)g
= minft 0 : mt  rl or mt  rRg.
Moreover, a0 is optimal on stopping if Z  f( ; rl) (equivalently if m  rl), a1 is optimal if
Z  f( ; rR) (equivalently if m  rR), and a2 is never optimal.
(b) Assume u2 minfu10; u01g. Then
  = minft 0 : Zt  f(t; ~rl) or Zt  f(t; ~rR)g
= minft 0 : mt  ~rl or mt  ~rRg.
Moreover, a0 is optimal on stopping if Z  f( ; ~rl) (equivalently if m  ~rl), a1 is optimal if
Z  f( ; ~rR) (equivalently if m  ~rR), and a2 is never optimal.
In (a), the distinction between the two subcases depends on the relative magnitudes of rl1 and
. From (31) it follows that rl1 falls as u2 increases, while  does not depend on u2. Therefore, (a.i)
applies if the payo u2 to the unambiguous default is suciently large. The other factor leading
to (a.i) is large , equivalently (by (36)) small , which is supported by m0 large and m0 small.
Thus, (a.i) is supported also by large prior ambiguity.
In (a.i),   = 0 if eitherm0  rl2 (prior beliefs are strongly biased towards 0 and hence a0 is chosen
immediately), or m0  rR2 (prior beliefs are strongly biased towards 1 and hence a1 is chosen), or
m0  rl1 and m0  rR1 (the worst-case probabilities of both 0 and 1 are both suciently low that
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neither a0 nor a1 is attractive enough to justify the cost of sampling and hence a2 is chosen). That
leaves continuation being optimal at time 0 if and only if prior beliefs are "intermediate" in the
sense that
either: [rl2 < m0 < r
l
1] and m0 < r
R
2 ,
or: [rR1 < m0 < r
R
2 ] and m0 > r
l
2].
This continuation region could be empty. Since learning is only about the payos to a0 and a1,
the situation at time 0 that is least favorable to learning is where there is ex ante indierence
between a0 and a1 { then a long and hence costly sample would likely be needed to modify the
ex ante ranking of actions. In this case, therefore, it is optimal to reject learning and choose a2,
as in Theorem 1. However, if, for example, a1 is strictly preferred initially, then an incentive to
learn is that a relatively short interval of sampling may be enough to decide between a1 and a2. In
addition, if m0 is suciently large, say near 1, then near certainty that = 1 can lead to rejection
of learning and the immediate choice of a1, rather than of a2 as in the Ellsberg context.
In (a.ii),   = 0 i [m0;m0] is disjoint from (r
`; rR). Notably, the default action is not chosen
regardless of when sampling stops. Its payo u2 is too low (from (37), u2 < u

2 ) compared to the
expected payo of choosing a0 or a1, possibly after some learning. Moreover, even given some
learning, it is not optimal to choose a2 regardless of the realized sample, as explained in discussion
of Theorem 1. Under ex ante indierence, Lemma 1 implies that   > 0 in (a.ii). Combined with
(a.i), we see that if there is ex ante indierence between a0 and a1, then a2 is chosen if and only
if there is no learning, thus generalizing the result in the Ellsberg model. (The latter also assumes
u2 =
1
2
(u00+u10), which we see here is not needed for the preceding conclusion.)
Finally, consider (b), where the payo to the unambiguous action is so low that it would never
be chosen, regardless of prior beliefs and even in the absence of the option to learn. The optimal
strategy is similar to that in (a.ii) in form and interpretation - only the critical values may dier to
Epstein and Ji: Optimal Learning under Robustness and Time-Consistency
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2018-03-062 27
reect the dierent assumptions about payos. Another comment about (b) is that when m0 =m0,
then =  and the equations (33) dening the critical values ~rR and ~rl become
l(~rR)  l(~rl) = u11 u10+u00 u01
c^
~l(~rR)  ~l(~rl) = u00 u10
c^
,
which are equations (21.1.14) and (21.1.15) in Peskir and Shiryaev (2006).
Proof of the theorem is provided in the e-companion. Here we comment briey on the proof
strategy.
The strategy is to: (1) guess the P  in P0 that is the worst-case scenario; (2) solve the classical
optimal stopping problem given the single prior P ; (3) show that the value function derived in
(2) is also the value function for our problem (9); and (4) use the value function to derive  .
The intuition for the conjectured P  was given in x3.2 for the Ellsberg context. In this more
general context, it extends to the conjecture that P  should make P (fdZt > 0g j Zt > ezt) and
P (fdZt < 0g j Zt < ezt) as small as possible, by using mt when Zt > ezt and mt when Zt < ezt.
(See (EC.1) for the precise denition of P .) The search for the value function v begins with the
HJB equation which yields its functional form up to some constants to be determined by smooth
contact conditions between v and the payo function X (see Peskir and Shiryaev (2006) for this
free-boundary approach to analysing optimal stopping problems). A new ingredient relative to
existing models stems from the nature of P , specically from the fact that the relevant posterior
probability at t switches between mt and mt as described, implying that the form of the value
function diers between the regions Zt > ezt and Zt < ezt. Thus, in addition to ensuring a smooth
contact at stopping points, one must also be concerned with the smooth connection at ezt.
We elaborate on the latter point in order to highlight the technical novelty that arises from
ambiguity. For concreteness consider (a.ii), where a2 is never chosen. Let y denote a posterior
probability, computed using m0 or m0, depending on the sub-domain, and let V
R(y) : [;1]!
[0;+1) and V l(y) : [0; ]! [0;+1) denote corresponding candidates for the value in the indicated
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regions. Then the variational inequality and smooth contacts lead to the following free-boundary
dierential equation, in which rR 2 (;1] and rl 2 [0; ) are also unknowns to be determined:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
V Ryy(y) = c^
1
y2(1 y)2 ; y 2 (; rR)
V R(rR) = (u11 u10)rR+u10
V Ry (r
R) = (u11 u10)
V lyy(y) = c^
1
y2(1 y)2 ; y 2 (rl; )
V l(rl) = (u00 u01)rl+u00
V ly (r
l) = (u00 u01),
(39)
and the (new) smooth contact conditions due to ambiguity ( < ):8><>:
V R() = V l();
V Ry () = V
l
y ():
(40)
In (a.ii), payo symmetry leads to the simplication V Ry () = V
l
y () = 0, which leads to (32)
becoming two separated equations. However, in (b), the connection is not trivial.
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EC.1. Proof of Theorem 4
Below "almost surely" qualications should be understood, even where not stated explicitly, and
as dened relative to any measure in P0.
To compute the payo Xt dened in (16), note that
min
2Mt
Z
u (a0; )d = (u00 u01)(1 mt)+u01;
min
2Mt
Z
u (a1; )d = (u11 u10)mt+u10:
There is a critical level of u2, denoted u

2,
u2 =
u11u00 u10u01
u00+u11 u01 u10 .
If u2  u2, then Xt = 8><>:
(u00 u01)(1 mt)+u01 if mt <
(u11 u10)mt+u10 if mt  .
Accordingly, the default action a2 is not optimal at any t, and a0 (a1) is optimal conditional on
stopping at t if mt < (mt  ). If u2 >u2, then Xt =8>>>>><>>>>>:
(u00 u01)(1 mt)+u01 if mt < u00 u2u00 u01
(u11 u10)mt+u10 if mt  u2 u10u11 u10
u2 otherwise,
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reecting the conditional optimality of a0, a1 and a2 respectively in the three indicated regions.
As in x2, for any  2M0, t denotes its Bayesian posterior at t and bt = R dt is the corre-
sponding posterior estimate of . The two extreme measures = , , are dened by
t (1) =mt and t (1) =mt,
and yield the estimates ^t and ^

t respectively. Let P
 be the probability measure in P0 which has
density generator process (t),
 t = (^t =)1Ztezt +(^t =)1Zt>ezt . (EC.1)
It will be shown that P  is the worst-case scenario in P0.
Proof of (a.ii): Consider the classical optimal stopping problem under P ,
max

EP [X   c ]. (EC.2)
Dene g1 and g2 by, for 0< y < 1, i= 1;2,
gi(y;C2i 1;C2i) = c^(2y  1) log( y
1  y )+C2i 1y+C2i, (EC.3)
where the constants Ci (i= 1, 2, 3, 4) are determined by smooth-contact conditions.
We conjecture that the value function for (EC.2) has the form: v(t; z) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(u00 u01)(1 mt (z))+u01 if z < f(t; rl)
g1(mt (z) ;C1;C2) if f(t; r
l) z < ezt
g2(mt (z) ;C3;C4) if ezt  z < f(t; rR)
(u11 u10)mt (z)+u10 if f(t; rR) z;
(EC.4)
where
C1 =  c^`(), C3 = c^`()
C2 = (u00 u01)(1  rl)+u01
 c^[(2rl  1) log( r
l
1  rl )  `()r
l]
C4 = (u11 u10)rR+u10
 c^[(2rR  1) log( r
R
1  rR )  `()r
R].
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(Note that the cut-o value u2 dened in (34) satises u

2 = g1(;C1;C2) = g2(;C3;C4) =
v(t; ezt).)
Lemma EC.1. v is the value function of the classical optimal stopping problem (EC.2), i.e., for
any t 0,
v(t; z) =max
t
EP [X t  c(   t) jZt = z].
Further, v satises the HJB equation
maxfX(t; z)  v(t; z); c+ vt(t; z)+ 1
2
2vzz(z)+ f(t; z)vz(t; z)g= 0, (EC.5)
where f(t; z)
[1  1  0
1+ m0
1 m0'(t; z)
]1fz<eztg+ [1  1  01+ m0
1 m0'(t; z)
]1fzeztg. (EC.6)
Finally, v also satises, 8z 2 (f(t; rl); f(t; rR)),
 c+ v(t; z)+ 1
2
2vzz(z)+ f(t; z)vz(t; z) = 0: (EC.7)
For the proof, rst verify that v satises the HJB equation (EC.5), and then apply El Karoui et
al. (1997, Theorems 8.5, 8.6). Alternatively, a proof can be constructed along the lines of Peskir
and Shiryaev (2006, Ch. 6).
Next prove that v is the value function of the (nonclassical) optimal stopping problem (9) (solving
the HJB equation is not sucient to imply this). We consider only t= 0 and prove
v(0; z) =max
0
min
P2P0
EP [X(Z )  c ].
By Lemma EC.1,
v(0; z) =max
0
EP [X(Z )  c ]max
0
min
P2P0
EP [X(Z )  c ].
To prove the opposite inequality, consider the stopping time
  = infft 0 : Zt  f(t; rl) or Zt  f(t; rR)g:
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For t  , by Ito's formula, (EC.5), and (EC.7), dv(t;Zt) =
[vt(t;Zt)+
1
2
2vzz(t;Zt)]dt+ vz(t;Zt)dZt (EC.8)
= [c  f(t;Zt)vz(t;Zt)]dt+ vz(t;Zt)dZt
= [c  f(t;Zt)vz(t;Zt)]dt+ vz(t;Zt)dZt.
Each P = P  2P0 corresponds to a density generator process (t), and (W t ) is a Brownian motion
under P , where
W t =
1

Zt+
1

Z t
0
~f(s;Zs; s)ds, and
~f(t;Zt; t) = [1  1  0
1+ t
1 t'(t;Zt)
].
Therefore, dv(t;Zt) =
[c+

~f(t;Zt; t)  f(t;Zt)

vz(t;Zt)]dt+vz(t;Zt)dW

t :
Note that

~f(t;Zt; t)  f(t;Zt)

vz(Zt)  0. (Suppose Zt < ezt. Then vz(Zt)  0 and ~f(t;Zt; t) 
f(t;Zt)  0, the latter because [1   1 01+ m1 m'(t;z) ] is increasing in m. Argue similarly for Zt < ezt.)
Take expectation above under P  to obtain
v(0; z)  EP [v( ;Z)  c ]
= EP [X   c ]:
The above inequality is due to
EP [
Z 
0
vz(t;Zt)dW

t ] = 0,
which is guaranteed by
max
P2P0
EP [
]<1; (EC.9)
see Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, Theorem 21.1) for the classical case. In our setting, (EC.9) is implied
by the boundedness of Xt because:
 1 < max
0
min
P2P0
EP (X   c) =max
0
[ max
P2P0
EP (c  X )]
 max
0
[max
P2P0
EP (X ) max
P2P0
EP (c)] =)max
P2P0
EP [
]<1.
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Finally, because P  can be any measure in P0, deduce that
v(0; z)  min
P2P0
EP [X   c ]
 max
0
min
P2P0
EP [X   c ].
Conclude that v is the value function for our optimal stopping problem and that   is the optimal
stopping time.
Remark EC.1. The preceding implies that P  is indeed the minimizing measure because the
minimax property is satised:
max
0
EPX (Z ) = max
0
min
P2P0
EPX (Z )
min
P2P0
max
0
EPX (Z )  max
0
EPX (Z ) =)
min
P2P0
max
0
EPX (Z ) = max
0
min
P2P0
EPX (Z ) .
Proof of (a.i): The proof is similar to that of (a.ii). The only dierence is that the value function
v is given by v(t; z) =8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(u00 u01)(1 mt (z))+u01 if z < f(t; rl2)
g3(mt (z) ;C5;C6) if f(t; r
l
2) z < f(t; rl1)
u2 if f(t; r
l
1) z < f(t; rR1 )
g4(mt (z) ;C7;C8) if f(t; r
R
1 ) z < f(t; rR2 )
(u11 u10)mt (z)+u10 if f(t; rR2 ) z.
(EC.10)
Here g3 and g4 are identical to g1 and g2 (dened in (EC.3)) respectively, except that the constants
C1; :::;C4 are replaced respectively by C5; :::;C8 given by
C5 =  c^`(rl1), C7 = c^`(rR1 )
C6 = u2  c^[(2rl1  1) log(
rl1
1  rl1
)  `(rl1)rl1]
C8 = u2  c^[(2rR1   1) log(
rR1
1  rR1
)  `(rR1 )rR1 ].
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Proof of (b): Since it is never optimal to choose a2, we can delete it from the set of feasible
actions. The proof proceeds as in (a.ii), though we dene v(t; z) =8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(u00 u01)(1 mt (z))+u01 if z < f(t; ~rl)
g5(mt (z) ;C9;C10) if f(t; ~r
l) z < ezt
g6(mt (z) ;C11;C12) if ezt  z < f(t; ~rR)
(u11 u10)mt (z)+u10 if f(t; ~rR) z;
where g5 and g6 are identical to g1 and g2 (dened in (EC.3)) respectively, except that the constants
C1; :::;C4 are replaced respectively by C9; :::;C12 given by
C9 =  c^`(~rR)+u11 u10
C11 =  c^`(~rl)+u01 u00
C10 = u10  c^[1 el(~rR)]
C12 = u00  c^[1 el(~rl)].
EC.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Dene l^(r) = (2r 1) log( r
1 r ). We prove the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the following
equations:
(32): Follows from l : (0;1)! ( 1;1) being surjective, continuous and strictly increasing.
(33): Adapt the argument in Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, p. 290) used for a classical optimal
stopping problem, generalized here to our context with ambiguity. For xed r^l 2 (0; ), consider
the following equation for V l(y):8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
V l(y) = c^l^(y)+ C^1y+ C^2
V ly (y) = c^l(y)+ C^1
V l(r^l) = (u00 u01)r^l+u00
V ly (r^
l) = u01 u00,
(EC.11)
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where y 2 (0;1) and C^1, C^2 are constants to be determined. The solution is
V l(y) = c^l^(y)  (u00 u01+ c^l(r^l))y+u00+ c^(r^ll(r^l)  l^(r^l)).
Because V l(y) depends on r^l, we denote the solution by V l(y; r^l). If V l(; r^l)<u00, then we consider
the following equation for V R(y): 8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
V R(y) = c^l^(y)+ C^3y+ C^4
V Ry (y) = c^l(y)+ C^3
V R() = V l(; r^l)
V Ry () = V
l
y (; r^
l),
(EC.12)
where y 2 [;1) and C^3, C^4 are constants to be determined. The solution is
V R(y) = c^l^(y)+ (V ly (; r^
l)  c^l())y+V l(; r^l)+ c^(l()  l^()) V ly (; r^l).
Denote the solution by V R(y; r^l). Since l^00(y) = l0(y)> 0 for y 2 (0;1), it is easy to see that V l(y; r^l)
and V R(y; r^l) are strictly convex functions. Recall that  =mt(ezt),  =mt(ezt) and (u11  u10) +
u10 = (1 ) (u00   u01) + u01. Then, V R() = V l(; r^l) implies that the function y 7 ! V R(y; r^l)
intersects y 7 ! (u11   u10)y + u10 for some y 2 (;1) when r^l is close to . Let y = y^l satify
V l(y; r^l) = u00. Then, y^
l # 0 as r^l # 0.
Then, reducing r^l from  down to 0 and applying the properties established above, we obtain
the existence of a unique point r^l 2 (0; ) for which there exists r^R 2 (;1) such that
V R(r^R ; r^
l
) = (u11 u10)r^R +u10 (EC.13)
V Ry (r^
R
 ; r^
l
) = u11 u10.
Combining (EC.11), (EC.12) and (EC.13), we can verify that (r^R ; r^
l
) is a solution of (33). Note
that each step of the derivation is reversible. Thus, there exists a unique solution (erR;erl) for (33).
Inequalities (35) follow directly from construction of the solution.
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(31) and (30): By the denition of u2 and equation (32), it is easy to check that u

2 >u01. Set
y^=
u00 u2
u00 u01 . Dene the following payo function
V (y) =
8><>:
 (u00 u01)y+u00 if y 2 (0; y^);
u2 if y 2 (y^;1).
Then arguing as in Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, p. 290), we can prove that there exists a unique
solution (rl2; r
l
1) for (31). The proof for (30) is similar. It is obvious that r
l
2 < r
l
1 and r
R
1 < r
R
2 due
to l being strictly increasing.
Turn to the remainder of the lemma (we skip the most obvious assertions). Given payo sym-
metry, the denitions of  and  imply that  +  = 1. Then rl + rR = 1 follows from (32) and
l (r)+ l (1  r) = 0.
Prove (37): Verify that 1
2
l (r) =el (r)  1
2r(1 r) +1 and rewrite (30) as
~l(rR2 )  ~l(rR1 ) = 12rR2 (1 rR2 )  
1
2rR1 (1 rR1 )
+ u11 u10
c^
~l(rR2 )  ~l(rR1 ) = u2 u10c^ .
If u2 = u

2 , then, using payo symmetry, we can verify that r
R
2 = r
R, rR1 =  is the unique solution
of (30). Next we prove that the solution rR1 of (30) is increasing with respect to u2. Note that
l0(r) = 1
r2(1 r)2 and
~l0(r) = 1
r(1 r)2 . From (30), derive
l0(rR2 )
drR2
drR1
  l0(rR1 ) = 0
~l0(rR2 )
drR2
drR1
drR1
du2
  ~l(rR1 )
drR1
du2
=
1
c^
.
Thus,
drR1
du2
=
(rR1 )
2(1  rR1 )2
c^(rR2   rR1 )
> 0,
which proves rR1  () u2  u2 . Similarly, we can prove that rl1   () u2  u2 . 
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EC.3. Proofs for the applications
Proof of Theorem 1 (Ellsberg): (i) Compute that c^= c
2
22
, ezt = 0,  = 1 2 ,  = 1+2 . Equations
(30) and (31) simplify to
rR2 + r
R
1 = 1; l(r
R
2 ) =
23
c2
rl2+ r
l
1 = 1; l(r
l
1) =
23
c2
,
(which exploit the fact that u2 =
1
2
(u00+u10)), and the functions f and f become
f(t; r) =
2
2
log(
1  
1+ 
r
1  r )
f(t; r) =
2
2
log(
1+ 
1  
r
1  r ).
If rl1 <
1+
2
, then f(t; rl1) 0 f(t; rR1 ). By Theorem 4(a.i), the signal Z0 = 0 falls in the stopping
region which leads to   = 0. This proves (i) with br= rl1.
(ii) Equation (32) becomes
rR+ rl = 1; l(rR)+ l(
1+ 
2
) = 4
3
c2
,
and
z  f(t; rR) = f(t; rl) = 
2
2

log(
1+ 
1  )+ log(
rR
1  rR )

:
By Theorem 4(a.ii),   =minft 0 : jZt j zg.
Let z be given by
z =
2
2
log(
1+ 
1  )< z.
It follows from (16) and (11) that at any given t, not necessarily an optimal stopping time, betting
on the ambiguous urn is preferred to betting on the risky urn i jZt j z. Thus at   > 0, jZ j=
z > z, and betting on the ambiguous urn is optimal on stopping.
Finally, we show that z is increasing in : `0 (r) = 1
r2(1 r)2 =) dzd > 0 i
2rR
1  `
0 (rR)> 1+
1 rR
1
2
`0
 
1+
2

i 1+
2
 1 
2
> rR (1  rR). But 1
2
< 1+
2
< rl1 < r
R =)
1+
2
 1 
2
> rl1 (1  rl1)> rR (1  rR). This completes proof of (ii) with r= rR. 
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Proof of Theorem 3 (hypothesis test): Given Theorem 4(b), it remains only to prove (29)
assuming that a = b. Payo symmetry implies that (33) reduces to (32). Using also Lemma 1,
conclude that ~rl = 1  ~rR and that ~rR solves l(erR) = l()+ b
c^
< b
c^
. For Bayesians,  =  = b
a+b
, and
(27) implies that ~rlB = 1  ~rRB and l(~rRB) = a+b2c^ = bc^ . Hence ~rR < ~rRB. 
